Sync security
Astros sync encrypts your secrets end to end. Everything else syncs as ordinary data over HTTPS and is readable by our servers.
| Data | Protection |
|---|---|
| API keys and connected-account credentials | End-to-end encrypted on your device with a key derived from your passphrase. The server stores only ciphertext. |
| Go Links, snippets, profiles, agent and plugin configs, settings | Sent over HTTPS (TLS) and stored as plaintext rows. The server can read them. |
Design
Section titled “Design”Sync is row-level: each Go Link, snippet, profile, config, and so on is its own row, and devices pull only what changed since their last sync.
- Key derivation — your passphrase is run through scrypt, with a per-user salt, on your device to derive the secrets key. The salt, KDF parameters, and a verifier are stored on the server; the passphrase and derived key are not.
- Cipher — secret-bearing rows are encrypted client-side with AES-256-GCM before upload.
- Wrong-passphrase detection — the verifier is a small AES-GCM-encrypted check value, so your device can tell locally whether the passphrase is right.
- Reset — if you lose your passphrase, you can reset the key. This deletes all of your synced secret ciphertext (it is unreadable without the old passphrase) and installs a new key; non-secret data is untouched.
Threat model
Section titled “Threat model”| Threat | Protection |
|---|---|
| Server compromise / hostile operator | Cannot read your API keys or account credentials without your passphrase. Can read Go Links, snippets, profiles, configs, and settings. |
| Network eavesdropper | All sync traffic uses HTTPS. |
| Lost passphrase | No recovery. Reset the key; synced secrets are deleted and must be re-entered. |
| Weak or compromised passphrase | An attacker who also obtains a server snapshot can attempt to brute-force or decrypt your secrets. Use a strong, unique passphrase. |
| Compromised device | All on-device data is exposed. Use disk encryption. |
Open questions we’re working on
Section titled “Open questions we’re working on”- Hardware-bound wrap (Touch ID / Windows Hello) for the most sensitive secrets.
- Open-source publishing of the sync/crypto module for independent review.